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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Petitioner-Appellant Gene Francis Stuart appeals from the district court's
Memorandum Opinion on Petition for Post Conviction Relief andor Writ of Habeas
Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Death and for New
Sentencing Trial ("Memorandum Order") and the Judgment Dismissing Case With
Prejudice, denying relief from his successive post-conviction andor habeas petition and
Rule 35 motion, all stemming from Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings
The facts leading to Stuart's conviction for the first-degree torture murder of
three-year-old Robert Miller are detailed in State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 165-66, 715

Appellant and Kathy Miller, the mother of the deceased victim,
Robert Miller, met in August, 1980, began dating, and subsequently
moved in together on September 20, 1980. Robert Miller was at that time
two years old, and he lived with appellant and his mother. Appellant then
assumed control over Robert. At that time the child was not yet toilet
trained, and much of the punishment imposed upon the child dealt with
this problem.
Appellant was a very dominant person and often critical of others
in his presence. He was a strict disciplinarian who required almost adult
behavior from Robert over the course of their relationship. Appellant and
Kathy Miller often argued about his treatment of Robert, and Ms. Miller
moved out of the premises several times after the child had been bruised
and beaten by the defendant.
In the spring and summer of 1981, appellant assumed primary
control over Robert, feeding, clothing and caring for him. Robert often
accompanied appellant to his place of business.
In late summer and early fall of 1981, appellant and Ms. Miller
began sharing the management duties at a small tavern near Orofino.

Appellant and Ms. Miller would work separate shifts, with Miller working
during the day and appellant working at night. Each would take care of
Robert while the other was working.
In October of 1980, there suddenly appeared bruises and blisters
on Robert's backside. In November of 1980, Robert had bruises across his
forehead and a black eye. Later in November, Robert sustained a tom and
cut ear. Various explanations were given by appellant for these injuries,
including a spanking with a stick for the backside bruises, and a tricycle
collision for the black eye. After the tom ear appeared, Ms. Miller moved
out because of the injuries to her son. Appellant later apologized and
convinced Miller to move back in. Ms. Miller apparently moved in and
out several times, at least some of which moves resulted from the force
used in Robert's discipline.
In March Robert's bottom, up the middle of his back, was covered
with bruises, which the defendant claimed resulted from a fall in the
shower. In April, Robert had bruises on his chin. Robert had little round
bruises on his chest in November of 1980 and September of 1981. These
bruises appeared because of appellant's habit of jabbing him in the chest
with a finger while scolding him.
Appellant had other unique requirements. He attempted to teach
Robert, a two year old, table manners, requiring that Roberi learn to
properly use his fork (pick it up with the left hand, transfer it to the right
hand, etc.) and use his napkin to wipe his mouth after every bite. If Robert
failed to perform correctly, he was often made to stand in a comer. Other
requirements of Robert were that he look only at his plate, and replace his
fork on the table after every bite. Appellant demanded these movements
of Robert while failing to follow them himself. At one time appellant hit
Robert on the hand with his fork when he picked up the fork with the
wrong hand.
There were two behaviors exhibited by Robert that appellant
punished in particular. One was "boobing", roughly translated as pouting
or sulking. The other was wetting his pants. After Robert would wet his
pants or exhibit any other unacceptable behavior, he would be given a cold
shower from which he would emerge shaking with cold and blue lips.
In May of 1981, Robert's penis was darkly bruised on the top and
bottom. There was no explanation for this injury. Also in May Robert's
bottom and head were bruised and scratched. Appellant explained that
Robert fell because the toilet seat broke when he sat on it. Also in May, a
silver dollar sized patch of hair was discovered as missing from Robert's
head. In early spring, Robert complained of a hurt left arm,although no
visible marks were seen.

On September 19, 1981, Ms. Miller was working the day shift at
the tavern with appellant caring for Robert. Appellant gave his version of
the events of that day at trial -- the only version available, since appellant
and Robert where alone during the day. Robert spent two hours at a
friend's house, where appellant picked him up and took him home. He
attempted to feed him lunch, but Robert refused to eat. According to
appellant, he then began poking Robert in the chest as punishment. He
then struck him in the chest with his fist, swatted him and directed him to
eat. Robert then proceeded to eat with no complaints. After Robert
finished eating, he was put down for a nap. According to appellant he
later went to check on him and found that Robert had vomited on the bed.
Appellant then bathed Robert and put him back down. However, he then
noticed that Robert's breathing was unusual. Appellant testified that at
this point Robert was still alive. He attempted mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation, and Robert again vomited. Appellant then purportedly
rushed Robert to the hospital. Robert was dead on arrival. Emergency
room personnel noted that Robert's body was cold, indicating the
possibility that he had been dead for longer than appellant's testimony
would indicate.

An autopsy was conducted upon Robert, which disclosed the cause
of death as internal hemorrhaging caused by the rupture of the liver. The
pathologist felt that this rupture was caused by more than one blow;
however, he admitted that a well placed single blow could have caused the
rupture. The pathologist also testified that death would have occurred
between one and one and a half hours after such injury, contradicting
appellant's testimony concerning the time frame of events of the
afternoon. A number of bruises were found on the victim's body, both
internal and external. These bruises were of differing ages. In addition,
Robert had suffered a subdural hematoma in the head region, which the
pathologist testified would have been caused only by a fair amount of
blunt trauma to the head. Also, X-rays taken of Robert indicated that he
had suffered a broken left arm several months before the date of death.
An Amended Information was filed charging Stuart with first-degree murder by
torture and a habitual offender sentencing enhancement. (#14865, R., pp.14-16.)' Upon
completion of his trial, a jury found Stuart guilty as charged (#14866, R., p.70) and he
pled guilty to the sentencing enhancement (#14865, p.81). The state filed a Notice of

' Because there are several records and transcripts involved in this appeal from several
different cases in
the state will refer to the records and transcripts by their
respective supreme court numbers.

w,

Intent to Request Death Penalty. (#14865, R., pp.83-84.) After a sentencing hearing, the
district court found the state had proven two statutory aggravating factors: (1) the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel and (2) the defendant by prior conduct or
conduct in the commission of the murder at hand has exhibited a propensity to commit
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society.

(#14865, R.,

pp.214-15.) After concluding, "it could find nothing in mitigation which would outweigh
the aggravated circumstances of this crime and this defendant," the court sentenced Stuart
to death. (#14865, R., pp.216,227-28.)
Among the issues on appeal, Stuart contended, "participation of the jury in the
sentencing process should have been required." Stuart I, 110 Idaho at 174. The Idaho
Supreme Court rejected Stuart's argument, "We have also considered the argument that
the jury should participate in sentencing and have not found it to be constitutionally
required. [Citations omitted]. We see nothing presented by the facts of this case which
would otherwise require jury participation."

Id. at

175. On May 3, 1985, Stuart's

conviction and death sentence were affirmed on appeal. See StuartI.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's First Post-Conviction Case
Stuart filed his first post-conviction petition on June 3, 1986 (#17014, R., pp.16377), which included a claim that juries are constitutionally required to find statutory
aggravating factors before the death penalty can be imposed (#17014, R., p.164).2 The
district court gave notice of its intent to summarily dismiss Stuart's petition. (#17014, R.,
pp. 189-95.) Expressly addressing Stuart's claim regarding jury participation in a capital

Stuart's first post-conviction case was filed under the same district court case number as
his underlying conviction and death sentence, #8495.
4

sentencing, the court recognized it should be dismissed because the issue was addressed
on direct appeal. (#17014, R., p.190.) The district court denied post-conviction relief.
(#17014, R., pp.234-41.) On October 16, 1990, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the
district court. Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 867, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990) (Stuart 11).
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Second Post-Conviction Case
Stuart's second post-conviction petition was filed September 12, 1988, which
contended government officials had recorded attorney-client communications while he
was in the Cleanvater County Jail. (#18653, R., pp.24-45.) Relying upon the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedures Act ("UPCPA"), the state filed a memorandum asserting the
petition was an improper second petition. (#18653, R., pp.85-93.) The district court
entered an order indicating its intent to dismiss, concluding the "newly discovered
evidence" of alleged monitoring "fail[ed] to raise a substantial question of fact which
would change the conviction or sentencing" and, based upon I.C. $ 19-4908, that the
petition was an improper second petition because Stuart failed to establish the claims
"were not available or known to the Petitioner at the time the original petition was filed."
(#18653, R., pp.94-103.) After Stuart responded, the district court entered its final order
dismissing post-conviction relief. (#18653, R., pp.176-78.)
Relying upon I.C.

5

19-4908, on appeal, the supreme court determined Stuart's

successive petition was timely because "the facts surrounding the second petition were
not known to the appellant until the summer of 1988." Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932,
934, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990) (Stuart 111). Concluding there were material issues of fact
concerning the monitoring and recording of attorney-client conversations, the supreme
court also remanded for an evidentiary hearing.

Id.at 934.

On remand, the district court bifurcated the evidentiary hearing, concluding it
would first determine whether attorney-client conversations were actually monitored or
recorded. (#20060, Tr., pp.166-67.) After the evidentiary hearing, the district court
determined Stuart failed to meet his burden of establishing any attorney-client
conversations were monitored or recorded. (#20060, R., pp.537-70.)
On appeal, the supreme court concluded the district court erred when it found the
destruction of some phone logs was not attributable to the state and, because the state
allegedly concealed the existence of a taped conversation between Stuart and his sister
which allegedly would have led to the discovery of "surreptitious tape recording
sufficient to preserve the phone logs," the supreme court remanded the case with
instructions to give Stuart "the benefit of a favorable inference concerning the destroyed
evidence." Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 814-17,907 P.2d 783 (1995) (Stuart IV).
On remand, the district court concluded the "favorable inference concerning the
destroyed evidence" supported Stuart's contention that attorney-client conversations were
monitored andor recorded, and held another evidentiary hearing to determine whether
the evidence at trial "had an origin independent of the eavesdropping." (#26661, R.,
pp.75-84.)

After the hearing, the district court found the state had proven three

exceptions to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, including: (1) the independent
source exception; (2) the inevitable discovery exception; and (3) the attenuated basis
exception. (#26661, R., pp.367-95.) Therefore, the court entered judgment denying postconviction relief. (#26661, R., pp.396-97.) On December 4, 2001, the Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001) (Stuart VI).

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Rule 60(b) Motion
While litigating his second post-conviction petition, Stuart filed a Motion for
Relief from Judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b) in his first post-conviction case, contending
State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 852 P.2d 87 (1993) -- in which the Idaho Supreme Court
reversed a murder case because the jury was not instructed on second degree murder by
torture -- should be applied retroactively to his case. (#21654, R., pp.1-11.) Concluding
that "authority in this and other jurisdictions, as well as the law of this case, Tribe should
not be applied retroactively to Stuart," the district court denied Stuart's motion. (#21654,

R., pp.17-19.) On February 15, 1996, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district
court, concluding, "Even if Tribe had overruled Stuart I, the fact that Stuart I was final
when Tribe was issued would preclude retroactive application." Stuart v. State, 128
Idaho 436,438,914 P.2d 933 (1996) (citing Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,418-19, 825
P.2d 1073 (1991) (Stuart V) ("holding new decision on death penalty sentencing did not
apply retroactively to already final case")).
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Stuart's Third Post-Conviction case3
On June 24, 2002, the Supreme Court issued &, expressly overruling, in part,
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), which had held a judge, sitting without a jury,
was permitted to find statutory aggravating factors even if necessary for imposition of the
death penalty, and found that a jury must now find the statutory aggravating
circumstances before a death sentence can be imposed.

Stuart also filed a fourth post-conviction petition which is the subject of a separate
appeal pending before this Court. (#34200, R., pp. 1-44,)
7

On August 2, 2002, relying exclusively upon

m,Stuart filed his instant Petition

for Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Death and for New Sentencing Trial, containing ten
separate claims. (#34198, R., pp.5-16.) The state filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal
(#34198, R., pp.50-51), which the district court granted, concluding, pursuant to
v. Surnmerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), and Hoffman v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958
(2005), that Ring is not retroactive in cases on collateral review. (#34198, R., pp.31922.) Judgment was filed April 18, 2007. (#34198, R., pp.344-46.) Stuart filed timely
notices of appeal on April 23,2007. (#34198, R., pp.350-59.)
While Stuart's instant appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued Danforth v.
Minnesota, --- U.S. ---,128 S.Q. 1029, 1035 (2008), holding that the federal rule of
retroactivity articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), does not limit state
courts from applying a broader rule of retroactivity even if the new rule of law is based
upon the federal Constitution. Five Idaho death-sentenced inmates had petitions for
certiorari pending at that time raising similar arguments, which were granted with an
order remanding to the Idaho Supreme Court "for further consideration in light of

Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. --- (2008)." Rhoades v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---,128 S.Ct.
1441 (2008); McKinney v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---,128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008); Pizzuto v. Idaho, --U.S. ---,128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008); Card

V.

Idaho,

---

U.S. ---,128 S.Q. 1442 (2008);

Hairston v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---,128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008).~

The appeals on remand are pending before the Idaho Supreme Court, which has
consolidated the cases for purposes of briefing and oral argument.

Stuart has stated the issue on appeal as follows:
Whether, under the settled Idaho three-part test for determining the
extent to which a new court decision retroactively applies, Ring must be
applied in Petitioner's case.
(Appellant's brief, p. 1.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as follows:
Because his successive post-conviction petition is governed by I.C. 4 19-2719,
which does not contain a provision for the retroactive application of new rules of law, has
Stuart failed to establish the district court had jurisdiction to grant him post-conviction
relief based upon the dictates of Ring v. Arizona, and because Stuart has failed to meet
the dictates of LC. 4 19-2719, must his appeal be dismissed?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Grant Stuart Post-Conviction Relief
Because I.C. 6 19-2719 Does Not Grant The Courts Jurisdiction To Retroactively Apvly
New Rules Of Law In Cases On Collateral Review
A.

Introduction
~ l t h o u ~Stuart's
h
successive petition raises ten different claims, each is based

upon Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The district court dismissed Stuart's petition
based upon Schriro v. Sunmerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), which held that Ring is not
retroactive under Teanue v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which is the federal retroactivity
law that generally prohibits the retroactive application of new rules of law to cases on
collateral review. The court also relied upon Hoffman v. State, 142 Idaho 27, 121 P.3d
958 (2005), concluding the Idaho Supreme Court had applied

in determining

Ring has no retroactive application in Idaho.
Based upon Danforth v. Minnesota, --- U.S. ---,128 S.Ct. 1029 (2008), Stuart
contends the district court erred because it did not apply the three-part test articulated in
State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489,491,531 P.2d 579 (1975), for the retroactive application
of new rules of law, which follows the three-part test adopted by the Supreme Court in
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), that was abandoned by the Court in Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) and

m.

Idaho Code Cj 19-2719 imposes a jurisdictional bar which prohibits the courts
from granting relief stemming from capital successive post-conviction claims unless the
claim fits the narrow exception of I.C. Cj 19-2719(5). Because I.C. Cj 19-2719 does not
provide an exception for the retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law, the
district court was without jurisdiction to grant post-conviction relief and this Court is

without jurisdiction to reverse the district court. Therefore, the state expressly moves this
Court to dismiss Stuart's appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court recently articulated the standard of review in appeals

stemming from the denial of post-conviction relief in capital successive petitions. "When
this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of
Idaho Code

3 19-2719, the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to

directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 192719 have beenmet, and rule accordingly." Hairstonv. State, 144 Idaho 51,55, 156 P.3d
552 (2007) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 575, 51 P.3d 387 (2002)), remanded
128 S.Ct. 1442 (2008).
on other grounds Hairston v. Idaho, --- U.S. ---,
C.

Stuart's Successive Post-Conviction Petition Is Governed By I.C. 6 19-2719
Idaho Code 5 19-2719 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures

in all capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction
proceedings which are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
(UPCPA), are civil in nature and governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). Idaho Code

5

19-2719 does

not eliminate the applicability of the UPCPA in capital cases, but acts as a modifier and
"supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict." McKinne~v. State,
133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144 (1999);

m,127 Idaho at 470.

Specifically, I.C. $ 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which

must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in I.C.

5

19-2719(5),

which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within
the time frame allowed by the statute."

Id.120 Idaho at 807.

to comply with the specific requirements of I.C.

5

If a capital defendant fails

19-2719, including the specified time

limits, the issues are "deemed to have [been] waived" and "[tlhe courts of Idaho shall
have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any
such relief." LC. $ 19-2719(5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700.
A capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has

a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that
petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at
471. Even if the petitioner can demonstrate the claims were not known or could not
reasonably have been known, I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(a) details the additional requirements that
must be met before the successive petition may be heard:

An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material
facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed.
I.C.

5 19-2719(5)(a).

Failure to meet the requirements of I.C.

5 19-2719(5)(a) mandates

dismissal of the successive post-conviction petition. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-

Additionally, claims which were not known or which could not have reasonably
been known within forty-two days of judgment "must be asserted within a reasonable
time after they are known or reasonably could have been known." Paz v. State, 123
Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. If the petitioner
fails to comply with each of the requirements detailed in I.C.

5

19-2719(5), the petition

must be summarily dismissed. I.C. 5 19-2719(5) specifically provides:
If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section
and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived
such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been
known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such
claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the Idaho Supreme
Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the passage of I.C. 5 19-2719:
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to
expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences."
The statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by
requiring that a11 collateral claims for relief . . . be consolidated in one
proceeding. . . ." We hold that the legislature's determination that it was
necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational
basis for the imposition of the 42-day time limit set for I.C. 5 19-2719.
The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with
a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative
purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences.
The United States Supreme Court has specifically approved requiring a criminal
defendant to present all of his collateral claims in a single post-conviction proceeding. In
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court, discussing federal habeas corpus
proceedings which prohibit piecemeal litigation by requiring that all claims be brought in

a single petition for a writ of habeas corpus, explained the respective states can employ a
similar procedure for post-conviction relief procedures. The Court concluded:
There can be no doubt that States may likewise provide, as Maine
has done, that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all
known constitutional claims in a single proceeding. Indeed, the Court of
Appeals agreed that the Maine statutory scheme was an "orderly
procedure of the state courts," as that term is used in Fay v. Noia, 1372
U.S. 391, 438, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963)l. No prisoner
has a right either under the Federal Constitution or under 28 U.S.C. S: 2241
to insist upon piecemeal collateral attack on a presumptively valid
criminal conviction in the face of such a statutory provision.
Id. at 45-46.
Idaho Code § 19-2719 also has a great deal of interplay with federal habeas law.
The ability of a state to ensure that its judgments carry a measure of finality rather than
being subject to repetitive federal attack, depends in substantial measure on the regular
and consistent enforcement of state procedural rules and bars. Addressing the interplay
between state procedural bars and federal review, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v.
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988), refused to honor a state procedural bar. The Court
i

explained:
[W]e consider whether that bar provides an adequate and independent
state ground for the refusal to vacate petitioner's sentence. "[W]e have
consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in
compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a
federal question is itself a federal question." Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443, 447, [85 S. Ct. 564, 567, 13 L. Ed. 2d 4081 (1965). "[A] state
procedural ground is not 'adequate' unless the procedural rule is 'strictly
or regularly followed.' Burr v. City o f Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, [84
S. Ct. 1734, 1736, 12 L. Ed. 2d 7661 (1964)." Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457
U.S. 255,262-263, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 2426-2427, 72 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1982);
see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 447-448, 85 S. Ct. at 567-568. We
find no evidence that the procedural bar relied on by the Mississippi
Supreme Court here has been consistently or regularly applied. Rather,
the weight of Mississippi law is to the contrary.
Id. at 587.
-

The Idaho Supreme Court has historically followed the requirements of I.C. 5 192719, strictly and regularly dismissing successive capital post-conviction relief claims
because of petitioners' failure to meet the narrow exception of I.C. § 19-2719(5). See
Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 51 P.3d 387 (2002); Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257, 32
P.3d 151 (2001); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573,21 P.3d 895 (2001); Rhoades v. State, 135
Idaho 299, 17 P.3d 243 (2000); Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (1996);
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995); Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100,
897 P.2d 991 (1995); Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); Fetterly v.

w,
121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991). The Court has also historically followed the
requirements of I.C.

5

19-2719, strictly and regularly affirming the district courts'

dismissal of successive capital post-conviction claims because of petitioners' failure to
meet the narrow exceptions of I.C. 5 19-2719(5), including the pleading requirements of

I.C.

$5

19-2719(5)(a) and (b). See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000);

Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8
P.3d 636 (2000); McKinnev v. State, 133 Idaho 695,992 P.2d 144 (1999).
D.

Because The Claims In His Successive Petition Do Not Fall Within The
Exception Contained In I.C. 6 19-2719(5), Stuart's Appeal Must Be Dismissed
As detailed above, capital defendants are provided only one opportunity to raise

all factual and legal challenges to the conviction and sentence, which must be filed within
forty-two days after entry of judgment. Rhoades, 120 Idaho at 806. The only exception
is for those claims which were not known and reasonably could not have been known
within the time frame allowed by the statute.

Id.

As in Hoffman, 142 Idaho at 30,

because Stuart previously raised the claim of jury participation in a capital sentencing, the

claims in his successive petition "were clearly known and asserted in prior proceedings."
Therefore, on the basis of I.C. 19-2719(5), Stuart has failed to meet the only exception
permitting the filing of claims in a successive petition and, on this basis alone, his appeal
must be dismissed.
However, Stuart contends this Court should apply the three-prong Linkletter test
for determining whether Ring is retroactive in cases on collateral review in Idaho.
(Appellant's brief, pp.2-12.) Contrary to Stuart's contention "that this Court has never
wavered in its adherence to its three-pronged test for determining the retroactive effect of
new rules of law" (Appellant's brief, p.2.), this Court has never applied the threepronged Linkletter test in capital cases. Rather, this Court has implicitly applied I.C. §
19-2719 to address whether Idaho law permits the retroactive application of new rules of
law raised in successive post-conviction petitions.
In Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991), the petitioner
contended, "the Charboneau interpretation of LC.

8

19-2515 was not a claim that was

known or should have been known" when he filed his initial post-conviction petition.5
Because Charboneau had not been issued prior to the filing of his initial post-conviction
petition, Fetterly contended the claim was not known and reasonably could not have been
known when he filed his initial petition, and that it should be given retroactive
application. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized Charboneau was issued after the
petitioner filed his first post-conviction petition, but expressly reframed the issue, stating,
"the claim that the Charboneau interpretation of I.C.

5 19-2515 was not known or should

In State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989), the supreme court
concluded, "the trial court may sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial court
finds that all the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the
aggravating circumstances found and made imposition of death unjust."

not have been known misses the real issue. The real issue is whether Charboneau applies
retroactively to cases that were final at the time of its issuance." Fetterly, 121 Idaho at
418. Relying upon Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 3 14 (1987), the court recognized, "the
distinction between defendants whose cases were final before the issuance of

Ckarboneau and those whose cases were not is a valid distinction."

Id.at 418-19.

Based

upon that distinction, the court refused to retroactively apply Charboneau, concluding,
"the Charboneau interpretation of I.C.

3

19-2515 does not apply to the present case

because the present case was final prior to the issuance of Ckarboneau."

Id.

In dissent, Justice Bistline addressed the three-pronged Linkletter test and noted
Idaho had used the test "in both direct appeals and collateral attacks to determine the
retroactive effect of cases." Fetterlv, 121 Idaho at 420 (Bistline, J., dissenting). Justice
Bistline explained the Griffith test requires new constitutional rules to be applied
retroactively in criminal cases "to all cases pending on direct review or which are not yet
final" and did not apply to cases on collateral review.

Id. Because Griffith addressed

only retroactivity in direct review cases involving new constitutional rules, Justice
Bistline advocated for a continuation of the Linkletter three-part test for new rules of law
in cases on collateral review.

Id. at

420-21. However, the majority rejected Justice

Bistline's position when it relied upon Griffith, and concluded, "the Charboneau
interpretation of I.C.

3

19-2515 does not apply to the present case because the present

case was final prior to the issuance of Ckarboneau."

Id.at 419.

Stuart apparently contends the Court's discussion of Griffith was mere dicta and
should not be followed. (Appellant's brief, p.31.) This contention is simply incorrect.
As expressly stated by the court, the issue was not whether the Charboneau claim was

known or could have been known, "[tjhe real issue is whether Charboneau applies
retroactively to cases that were final at the time of its issuance." Fetterly, 121 Idaho at
418. Tliis language clearly establishes the Court's holding

-- that Charboneau did not

apply retroactively -- was based upon Griffith, and implied that I.C. § 19-2719 does not
contain a retroactivity exception for new claims in successive petitions.
However, even if dicta, it has been cited as the holding in subsequent cases. For
example, this basic principle of law was applied in Stuart V, in which the petitioner
sought retroactive application of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in State v. Tribe,
123 Idaho 721, 852 P.2d 87 (1993), which reversed a murder conviction because the jury
was not instructed on second-degree murder by torture. Relying upon Fetterl~,the
supreme court concluded, because Stuart's case was final when
court was precluded from applying

was issued, the

retroactively. Stuart V, 128 Idaho at 438.

The three-part Linkletter test was also implicitly rejected in State v. Card, 121
Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991), in which this Court applied Pavne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808 (1991), which overruled in part, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
Justice Bistline, again in dissent, contended that under Whitman,
applied retroactively,

should not be

m, 121 Idaho at 461-63 (Bistline, J., dissenting), which this

Court implicitly rejected when it applied Payne without any reference to the three-part
Linkletter test from Whitman.
Likewise, in Butler v. State, 129 Idaho 899, 901, 935 P.2d 162 (1997), the
petitioner sought the retroactive application of State v. Townsend, 124 Idaho 881, 865
P.2d 972 (1993), which held that hands, other body parts, or appendages may not by
themselves constitute deadly weapons under the aggravated assault and aggravated

battery statutes. Again, relying upon

w,the court concluded Townsend would not

be retroactively applied because the petitioner's direct appeal was final.

w,129

Idaho at 165-65.
Since Griffith, this Court has declined to retroactively apply new rules of law to
cases on collateral review in criminal cases. More importantly, there simply is not an
exception under I.C.

5

19-2719 providing for the retroactive application of either new

state or federal rules of law. Because there is no exception for the retroactive application
of new rules of law, Stuart's claims fail and were properly dismissed by the district court
requiring dismissal of his appeal by this Court.

E.

The Legislature Has Stated Its Clear Intent That I.C. 6 19-2719(5) Be Av~lied
Retroactively In Capital Cases
Stuart contends the "anti-retroactivity provision" of I.C.

5

19-2719 "cannot be

applied retroactively" because it "contains no express legislative statement that it should
itself be retroactively applied." (Appellant's brief, p.33.) Because Stuart's argument is
incorrect, it is without merit.
Idaho law "prohibits the retroactive application of newly passed legislation."
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 804, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992) (citing I.C.
However, I.C.

5

73-101).

73-101 provides an exception when the legislature declares its intent to

make a new rule of law retroactive.

Id. When the legislature enacted I.C. 5

19-2719 in

1984, it included the relevant portion of section (S), which reads as follows, "If the
defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits
specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or
reasonably should have been known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to

consider any such claim for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief." 1984
Idaho Sess. Laws 389. This portion of the statute is the same even today. At the time
1.C. § 19-2719 was passed, the legislature also expressly stated:
This act shall apply to all cases in which capital sentences were
imposed on or prior to the effective date of this act but which have not
been carried out, and to all capital cases arising after the effective date of
this act.
1984 Idaho Sess. Laws 390.
This language clearly states the legislature's intent to make I.C.

9 19-2719(5)

retroactive to all capital cases. Because of this language, Stuart's argument regarding the
retroactivity of I.C. 9 19-2719(5) fails.

F.

Stuart Has Failed To Establish LC. 6 19-2719 Violates Either The State Or
Federal Constitutions
Stuart raises several constitutional challenges to I.C. § 19-2719, including: (1)

Idaho's separation of powers doctrine; (2) the ex post facto doctrine; and (3) due process
andequal protection. (Appellant's brief, pp.34-35.) Because Stuart has failed to support
his contentions with authority and argument, they are waived. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966 (1996).

However, even if they are not waived, Stuart's

contentions fail.
1.

LC. 6 19-2719 Does Not Violate The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of
Powers Doctrine

Stuart contends I.C. § 19-2719 violates Idaho's constitutional separation of
powers doctrine. (Appellant's brief, p.34.) While Idaho's appellate courts have not
directly addressed this issue, it has been addressed in the context of habeas corpus.

In Mahaffev v. State, 87 Idaho 228,280, 392 P.2d 279 (1964), the Idaho Supreme
Court explained that because the writ of habeas corpus is expressly recognized in Idaho's
constitution, "the writ is not a statutory remedy." The court concluded, "While the
legislature (absent certain contingencies) is without power to abridge this remedy secured
by the Constitution, it may add to the efficacy of the writ. Statutes are usually enacted
for this purpose and should be construed so as to promote the effectiveness of the
proceeding."

Id.

Addressing the enactment of the UPCPA, the supreme court concluded

the UPCPA is "an expansion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho
235,237,459 P.2d 1017 (1969).
Because the UPCPA is an expansion of the writ of habeas corpus and the
legislature is not barred from adding to the efficacy of the writ, it naturally follows that
I.C. § 19-2719 does not unduly restrict the district court's jurisdiction in violation of the
separation of powers doctrine. Rather, I.C. § 19-2719 merely establishes the parameters
in which relief may be granted when a successive post-conviction petition has been filed.
As explained in Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Ctr., 134 Idaho 464, 471, 4 P.3d
1115 (2000):
Because it is properly within the power of the legislature to establish
statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, create new causes of action, and
otherwise modify the common law without violating separation of powers
principles, it necessarily follows that the legislature also has the power to
limit remedies available to plaintiffs without violating the separation of
powers doctrine.
Because the legislature has the power to limit the remedies available to plaintiffs,
it necessarily has the power to limit the remedies of capital petitioners in seeking postconviction relief. Stuart has failed to establish I.C. § 19-2719 results in a constitutional
violation under the separation of powers doctrine.

2.

Idaho Code 6 19-2719(5) Does Not Violate Ex Post Facto Laws

The United States Constitution, article I, § 10, and the Idaho Constitution, article

I, 5 16, prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. As explained in State v. Byers, the
United States Supreme Court has defined what constitutes an ex post facto law:
lst, every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d.
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of
the offense, in order to convict the offender.
102 Idaho 159, 166, 627 P.2d 788 (1981) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,

The Supreme Court's ex post facto jurisprudence has focused upon the third
category because such laws "implicate the central concerns of the Ex Post Facto Clause:
lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated." Lvnce v.

m,519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997) (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis
added).

As explained in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977), the Ex Post Facto
Clause generally does not apply to procedural matters:
It is equally well settled, however, that the inhibition upon the
passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in
all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed.
The constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal
rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, and not to limit the
legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not
affect matters of substance.

Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a
procedural change is not ex post facto.
(Internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has identified "two critical elements [that] must be present for
a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: It must be retrospective, that is, it must apply
to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected
by it." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1980)(footnote omitted). However, "no ex
post facto violation occurs if the change effected is merely procedural, and does not
increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts
necessary to establish guilt."

Id.at 29 11.12.

"Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto

Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and
governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was
prescribed when the crime was consummated."

Id.at 29 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court, in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), narrowed
what constitutes an ex post facto violation by overruling several prior cases. After the
defendant was sentenced, the Texas legislature amended the remedy that was available
when an unauthorized fine was imposed at sentencing. Under the law at the time the
defendant was sentenced, if the law did not authorize the fine, the judgment and sentence
were void and the defendant was entitled to a new trial.

Id. 497 U.S.

at 39. After

Youngblood was sentenced, new legislation was enacted permitting the appellate court to
merely reform an improper verdict, thereby eliminating the new trial remedy.

Id.at 40.

The Supreme Court reiterated that procedural changes do not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause.

Id.at 45.

The Court reasoned, "While these cases do not explicitly define what

they mean by the word 'procedural,' it is logical to think that the term refers to changes in

the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to changes in the
substantive law of crimes."

Id. at

45. The Court concluded the new statute "is a

procedural change that allows reformation of improper verdicts. It does not alter the
definition of the crime of aggravated sexual abuse, . . . nor does it increase the
punishment for which he is eligible."

Id.at 44 (emphasis added).

The Court explained

that language from other cases discussing whether a procedural change may violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause if it deprived a defendant of "substantial protections" or infringed
upon "substantial personal rights" had "imported confusion into the interpretation of the
Ex Post Facto Clause."

Id.at 45.

Idaho's appellate courts have followed the Supreme Court cases detailed above.

See State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 69-70, 90 P.3d 278 (2003). In Mellinger v. State,
113 Idaho 31, 34, 740 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1987), the Idaho Court of Appeals quoted
Dobbert, in concluding that a change in the statute of limitations in Idaho's Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedures Act ("UPCPA") was procedural in nature and did not
materially affect the petitioner's substantial rights. See also LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho
387, 389-90, 807 P.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1991); Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 913 P.2d
1160 (Ct. App. 1996). The Idaho Supreme Court expressly adopted Mellin~erin State v.
O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 247, 796 P.2d 121 (1990). In Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223,

.

227,912 P.2d 110 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court applied the rationale of O'Neill in a
capital case.
This same analysis has also been applied to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which was enacted by Congress in 1996 and significantly
changed the manner in which federal habeas cases are litigated and limited the cases in

which the federal courts can grant habeas relief. The federal courts have uniformly held
that, because the changes made by the AEDPA are procedural in nature, they do not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Libby v. Mamusson, 177 F.3d 43, 46-47 (lStCir.
1999); Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 560 (6" Cir. 2000); Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d
917, 921 (11" Cir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362 (2000)); United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161, 168-69 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Similar analysis was used in Mitchell v. State, 934 P.2d 346, 349 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1997), when the petitioner challenged amendments to Oklahoma's capital postconviction statutes. The court explained that, because such changes were "procedural in
nature," they did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Likewise, the enactment of I.C.

5

Id.

19-2719(5) was procedural in nature. The

statute "neither made criminal a theretofore innocent act, nor aggravated a crime
previously committed, nor provided a greater punishment, nor changed the proof
necessary to convict." Seymour, 224 F.3d at 560 (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293).
Rather, "these provisions simply limit the circumstances under which [Stuart] may
collaterally attack his conviction."

u,
177 F.3d at 46. Stuart has, therefore, failed to

establish an ex post facto violation.
3.

Idaho Code 4 19-2719(5) Does Not Violate Stuart's Due Process Or Eaual
Protection Rights

Stuart contends I.C.

5

19-2719(5) violates his equal protection and due process

rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.34-35.) In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 21 1-13, 766 P.2d
678 (1 988), the court expressly held I.C.

19-2719 does not violate equal protection. In

State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991j, the court expressly

concluded I.C. § 19-2719 does not violate due process. The Idaho Supreme Court has
repeatedly affirmed both of these cases. See Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 55, 156
P.3d 552 (2007), remanded on other grounds Hairston v. Idaho,

--- U.S. ---,128 S.Ct.

1442 (2008); Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100, 102, 897 P.2d 991 (1995); State v.
Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 647, 851 P.2d 934 (1993); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 430-

3 1, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991); State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P.2d 960 (1 991); &
v. State, 118 Idaho 542, 559, 798 P.2d 1 (1990); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 235-36,
766 P.2d 701 (1988). Because Stuart has failed to even cite these cases, he obviously has
failed to provide any argument as to why they are not controlling or should be
reconsidered.
G.

Because The Claims In His Successive Petition Seek The Retroactive Application
Of A New Rule Of Law In Violation Of I.C. 6 19-2719(5)(c), Stuart's Appeal
Must Be Dismissed
In 1995, the Idaho Legislature enacted I.C. § 19-2719(5)(c), which expressly

states, "A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed
facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of law."
1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 594. Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(c) is based upon the Court's
decision in Fetterly, which discussed the question of retroactivity. While Fetterly did not
expressly cite I.C.

19-2719(5), the legislature obviously wanted to ensure Justice

Bistline's dissent did not result in a judicially created exception permitting the retroactive
application of new rules of law in violation of the legislature's clear intent to limit claims
in successive petitions to those which were not known and could not reasonably have
been known when a capital petitioner's first petition was filed.

Stuart does not dispute that the claims in his successive petition are based upon
the retroactive application of a new rule of law, but challenges the statute, contending it
violates the following: (1) Idaho's separation of powers doctrine; (2) Idaho's law
regarding the retroactive application of new statutes; (3) due process and equal
protection; and (4) the ex post facto doctrine. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-29.) However,
Stuart has failed to explain how the analysis regarding his challenges is significantly
different from the challenges he makes regarding I.C.

5

19-2719(5). Because I.C.

9

19-

2719(5)(c) is nothing more than a reaffirmation and codification of Fetterly, there is no
significant difference in the analysis associated with I.C. 9 19-2719(5). Therefore, the
state relies upon its discussion above as it relates to I.C. 5 19-2719(5).

H.

Stuart Is Precluded From Challenging The Validity Of His Conviction Or
Sentence Via A Writ Of Habeas Corpus
Stuart attempts to salvage the claims in his successive post-conviction petition by

alternatively characterizing it as a "Writ of Habeas Corpus." (Appellant's brief, pp.3537.) An identical argument was expressly rejected by this Court in Porter v. State, 140
Idaho 780,783, 102 P.3d 1099 (2004).
However, even if Stuart's claims in his successive petition could be raised in a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, the district court was without jurisdiction to hear his
claims. Idaho Code 8 19-4202 expressly grants original jurisdiction to consider a petition
for writ of habeas corpus to the Idaho Supreme Court or "[tlhe district court of the county
in which the person is detained." In Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001),
the district court dismissed a habeas claim based upon the length and conditions of the
petitioner's confinement. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed Row's claim

because she filed the petition in Ada County, but was being detained at the Pocatello
Women's Correctional Center.

id. 135 Idaho at 580.

As detailed in Stuart's successive petition, he is being detained at the Idaho
Maximum Security Institution in Boise, Idaho. (ki34198, R., p.9.) Clearly, only the court
in Ada County had jurisdiction to hear any claims that are part of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that Stuart's appeal be dismissed or, alternatively,
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed on appeal.
DATED this 7" day of July, 2008.
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